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Can the Aim of Belief Ground Epistemic Normativity?1 
Charles Côté-Bouchard 
 
Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies 
 
Abstract: For many epistemologists and normativity theorists, epistemic norms necessarily 
entail normative reasons. Why or in virtue of what do epistemic norms have this necessary 
normative authority? According to what I call epistemic constitutivism, it is ultimately because belief 
constitutively aims at truth. In this paper, I examine various versions of the aim of belief thesis 
and argue that none of them can plausibly ground the normative authority of epistemic norms. 
I conclude that epistemic constitutivism is not a promising strategy for grounding epistemic 
normativity. 
 
1. Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Normativity 
Epistemology, many think, is about what we should or should not believe. It is, in other words, 
about epistemic norms, i.e. the norms that specify the epistemic or truth-related conditions 
under which we are required or permitted to believe things.2 While some maintain, for 
example, that we should only believe what is true or what we know, others claim that believing 
falsehoods is permissible as long we have adequate evidence for them.3 In what follows, I set 
the content of  epistemic norms aside however and focus instead on their normative force or 
authority.  
 While all norms trivially set standards relative to which certain things are required, 
permitted, good, and the like, not all of them have necessary normative force. If a norm N 
forbids φ-ing under conditions C, then trivially, φ-ing under C is forbidden, incorrect, wrong, 
or bad relative to the standard set by N. However, the descriptive, norm-relative question of what 
is permitted or required according to N is distinct from the normative question of what there is 
good or genuinely normative reasons to do.4 For any norm N, you can very well recognize that N says 
you should not φ under C and still ask whether there is any good reason to do as N says.5 
 Plausibly, most norms are such that the answer to this normative question could be ‘no’. 
For most norms, in other words, there could be situations in which there is no good reason for 
you to φ even though these norms ask you to φ. Philippa Foot famously illustrated this using 
the example of etiquette: 
                                                
1 I would like to thank Maria Alvarez, Terence Cuneo, Nick French, Elizabeth Fricker, Alex Marcoci, an 
anonymous referee from Philosophical Studies and audiences from the University of Edinburgh, UC Berkeley, and 
the 2015 London Spring Graduate Conference for their help and feedback. Thanks also to the Social Sciences 
and Humanities Research Council of Canada for its support. 
2 Let me make three clarifications. First, I actually take epistemic norms to govern doxastic attitudes, i.e. not only 
belief, but also disbelief and withholding or suspension of belief. I only mention belief in what follows for simplicity. 
Second, using ‘epistemic norms’ to denote only epistemic norms of belief is not strictly correct. Plausibly, there are 
also epistemic norms governing other things like assertion and treating something as a reason. I therefore take 
‘epistemic norms’ to be short for ‘epistemic norms of belief’ in this paper. Finally, I take ‘epistemic’ in ‘epistemic 
norms’ to mark not only that these norms govern beliefs – as opposed to actions and non-doxastic attitudes – but 
also that they govern beliefs from a distinctly epistemic or truth-related point of view – as opposed to, say, a moral 
or prudential point of view. Thus, I leave open the question whether epistemic norms also determine what we 
should or should not believe all things considered and whether there can be non-epistemic norms of belief. 
3 See e.g. Littlejohn and Turri (2014) for recent work on epistemic norms. 
4 I use ‘good reasons’ and ‘genuinely normative reasons’ interchangeably in what follows. I say more on these 
qualifications below. 
5 I borrow the phrase ‘normative question’ from Korsgaard (1996) and Broome (2013). The term ‘norm-relativity’ 
is from Hattiangadi (2007). Other labels used in the literature for the same distinction include, for instance, rule-
implying versus reason-implying normativity (Parfit 2011), formal versus robust normativity (McPherson, 2011), and 
weak versus strong categoricity (Joyce, 2001). 
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[…] one may reasonably ask why anyone should bother about what should-e, (should from the point of 
view of etiquette) be done, and that such considerations deserve no notice unless reason is shown. So 
although people give as their reason for doing something the fact that it is required by etiquette, we do not 
take this consideration as in itself giving us reason to act. Considerations of etiquette do not have any 
automatic reason-giving force, and a man might be right if he denied that he had reason to do “what's 
done.” (Foot 1972, 309) 
 
Similarly, Richard Joyce writes: 
 
Consider Celadus the Thracian, an unwilling gladiator: he’s dragged off the street, buckled into armor, 
and thrust into the arena. […] Let’s imagine that there are various rules of gladiatorial combat: you ought 
not throw sand in your opponent’s eyes, for instance. […] Imagine that things are looking bleak – his 
opponent is a sadistic professional fighter, and Celadus finds himself pinned down and swordless. His only 
hope is to throw some sand in his rival’s eyes. (Let’s stipulate, with utter implausibility, that he can get away 
with nobody seeing him do this, just as a way of being sure that there will be no negative repercussions in 
the form of punishment for breaking the rules.) The rules still say that Celadus shouldn’t do it, but he 
doesn’t care about the rules – he has no particular reason to follow them, and every reason to reject them. 
Given that he has never entered into any form of contract to follow the rules, and that following the rules 
will lead to his quick and unjust demise, I think we will all agree that Celadus ought to throw sand in his 
opponent’s eyes. (Joyce 2001, 34-35) 
 
We could multiply the examples. Plausibly, there is not automatically a good reason to conform 
to norms of  fashion, gender stereotypes, tradition, religious sects, the Sicilian Mafia code of  
conduct, and so on. The point is that most norms do not seem to necessarily entail or provide 
good reasons to do as they say. 
 For many normativity theorists however, some norms do have necessary normative force. 
It is widely held, for instance, that moral norms necessarily entail good or genuinely normative 
reasons.6 What about epistemic norms? Do they have necessary normative force like, perhaps, 
moral norms? Many epistemologists and normativity theorists think so. More precisely, many 
hold what I will call Epistemic Normativity: 
 
 (Epistemic Normativity) Epistemic norms necessarily entail good reasons; there is necessarily a 
good reason to conform to epistemic norms.7  
 
                                                
6 Why qualify reasons in this way? Just like ‘require’, ‘should’, ‘correct’, ‘right’, and so on, ‘reasons’ can be read in 
a descriptive, norm-relative way. All norms can be said to entail what could be called norm-relative reasons. So in 
a descriptive norm-relative sense, even norms like those of etiquette or fashion entail reasons, namely etiquette reasons 
and fashion reasons. These norm-relative reasons are just the considerations that favour φ-ing according to or from 
the point of view of these norms. Thus another way to formulate the point I make in this section is that you can 
very well recognize the descriptive fact that some consideration is a reason to φ relative to N (i.e. a N-relative 
reasons or N-reason), but still ask the further normative question whether this N-reason has genuine normative 
force, i.e. whether this N-reason constitutes a good reason. Moreover, many think that some norms are such that 
the reasons they entail are necessarily good ones. For example, moral reasons – the considerations that are reasons 
from the point of view of moral norms – are widely thought to necessarily be good reasons. Note however that this 
is not the same as the claim that what morality requires is necessarily what we should do all things considered. Many 
think that even though moral norms necessarily entail good reasons, such reasons can be outweighed by other 
considerations. The distinction is rather between norms that necessarily entail good pro tanto reasons and those 
that do not. 
7 In other words, just like moral reasons, epistemic reasons – the considerations that constitute reasons from the 
point of view of epistemic norms – are necessarily good reasons. Epistemic Normativity is widely defended or 
taken for granted in contemporary normativity theory and epistemology. In addition to proponents of the strategy 
I criticize below, see for instance Scanlon (1998), Kelly (2003), Cuneo (2007), Skorupski (2010), Raz (2011), and 
Parfit (2011). 
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My goal in this paper is not to defend or reject Epistemic Normativity. Instead, I would like 
to examine a particular kind of strategy for grounding or explaining it, i.e. a particular kind of 
answer to the question: why or in virtue of what do epistemic norms necessarily entail good 
reasons?8 The strategy is what I will call epistemic constitutivism (EC). According to EC, Epistemic 
Normativity is true ultimately in virtue of the fact that belief constitutively aims at truth.9 For epistemic 
constitutivists, in other words, the popular thesis that belief constitutively aims at truth – the 
aim of belief thesis for short – is ultimately all we need to vindicate the necessary normative force 
of epistemic norms.10 
 In what follows, I argue that EC is hopeless. I start by clarifying the epistemic constitutivist 
strategy in §2. I then examine the main possible interpretations of  the aim of  belief  thesis – i.e. 
the functional interpretation (§3), the personal interpretation (§4), and the normativist 
interpretation (§5) – and argue that none of  them can ground Epistemic Normativity. I 
conclude in §6 that epistemic constitutivism fails. We should either look for a different strategy 
for explaining the necessary normative force of  epistemic norms or abandon Epistemic 
Normativity altogether. 
 
2. Epistemic Constitutivism 
Epistemic constitutivism (EC) is a particular instance of  a more general strategy – normative 
constitutivism (NC) – for grounding the necessary normative force of  norms.11 NC typically starts 
with the claim that a certain activity, attitude, or kind of  being X has a constitutive aim A, the 
attaining of  which necessarily requires or involves conforming to some norms N. Roughly, to say 
that an aim A is constitutive of  X is to say that part of  what it is for something to be an instance 
of  X is for it to be directed or regulated towards attaining A. So something cannot count as an 
instance of  X unless it aims at A in some sense. The strategy is then to point out that X-ing or 
being X is inescapable for creatures like us. But since we cannot escape X and since X necessarily 
involves aiming at A, aiming at A is inescapable for us. Moreover, since attaining this unavoidable 
aim requires or involves conforming to norms N, it follows that N necessarily has normative 
                                                
8 See Grimm (2009) for an overview of the issue of grounding epistemic normativity.  
9 Or some other truth-related or epistemic goal such as knowledge, evidential support, coherence, and the like. I 
remain neutral regarding what belief aims at exactly. I only use truth as my example in this paper for simplicity 
and because it is the most popular candidate. See for instance Williams (1973), Railton (1994), (1997), Velleman 
(2000), Wedgwood (2002), Boghossian (2003), Shah (2003), Burge (2003), Millar (2004), Gibbard (2005), Shah and 
Velleman (2005), Steglich-Petersen (2006), (2009), Vahid (2006), Whiting (2010), (2012), and Littlejohn (2012). 
Knowledge is the most popular alternative. See Peacocke (1999), Williamson (2000), Adler (2002), Engel (2004), 
Bird (2007), Sutton (2007), Huemer (2007), McHugh (2011), and Littlejohn (2013). For an overview of issues 
surrounding the aim of belief thesis, see McHugh and Whiting (2014) and Fassio (2015). Note that many of these 
authors claim that truth or knowledge is the constitutive norm of belief. In this paper, I follow Wedgwood (2002) 
and take this normativist claim to be one possible interpretation of the aim of belief thesis. I return to normativism 
below.  
10 Velleman (2000), Wedgwood (2002), Shah and Velleman (2005), O’Hagan (2005), Steglich-Petersen (2009), and 
Tubert (2010). See Railton (1997) and Papineau (2013) for criticism. It is worth noting that some constitutivists 
focus exclusively on epistemic or theoretical rationality. That is, they only attempt to ground reasons to be 
epistemically or theoretically rational. This way of framing the issue is problematic however since it is not obvious 
that the requirements of epistemic rationality exhaust epistemic norms and what we epistemically should believe. 
After all, for many normativity theorists – e.g. Scanlon (1998), Parfit (2011), and Broome (2013) – what is most 
rational for you to do in general is not necessarily what you should or have most normative reasons to do. Similarly, 
some think that the epistemically rational thing to believe is not necessarily what we epistemically should believe. 
See for instance Kolodny (2005), Littlejohn (2012), Broome (2013), Sylvan (2014), and Worsnip (Forthcoming). 
Hence, it cannot be assumed that grounding the normative force of epistemic rationality would be sufficient for 
grounding Epistemic Normativity. 
11 See Tubert (2010) for an overview of normative constitutivism. 
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force for us. Constitutivism is popular in the practical domain. Many claim, for instance, that 
we can ground practical or even moral normativity in what is constitutive of  action or agency.12 
 One important motivation for adopting normative constitutivism is, roughly, that it 
promises to vindicate inescapable or necessary normativity without positing any metaphysically 
and epistemologically problematic facts. As such, it offers an attractive alternative to both 
nonnaturalist normative realism and normative error theory. Nonnaturalists claim that there 
are genuinely normative facts, but that they cannot be identified or reduced to natural facts.13 
Error theorists agree that necessary or inescapable normativity would require the existence of  
sui generis nonnatural facts, but argue that there are no such facts and therefore that there is 
no such thing as necessary or inescapable normativity.14 Constitutivism is attractive because it 
promises the best of  both worlds, namely genuine necessary normativity without mysterious 
entities. The key, constitutivists think, is to ground normativity in facts that are themselves 
necessary but not mysterious, i.e. in constitutive features of  inescapable things like agency and 
belief.  
 One complication is that constitutivism is often construed as a strategy for grounding the 
content of  norms. Christine Korsgaard, for example, argues that constitutive features of  agency 
not only ground the normative force of  morality, but also determine in part what morality 
requires.15 We should therefore distinguish normative constitutivism from what could be called 
norm-constitutivism, i.e. constitutivist strategies for deriving necessary constraints on the content 
of  norms. As I explained above, for any norm N, you can always recognize the fact that N asks 
you to φ, but still ask the normative question whether there is any good reason to do as N says. 
Hence, even if  we derived the content of  N via a constitutivist strategy, this would not suffice 
to settle the normative question with respect to N. My target in this paper is only epistemic 
constitutivism understood as an instance of  normative constitutivism. Thus, my rejection of  
EC leaves open the possibility of  deriving the content of  epistemic norms from the constitutive 
aim of  belief. 
 One could demur at this point and claim that grounding norms is sufficient for grounding 
normativity. One could claim, in other words, that normative reasons are nothing over and 
above norm-relative reasons, and that normativity is nothing over and above norm-relativity.16 
There is no space to properly evaluate this suggestion here. However, note that if  it were true, 
then all we would have to do in order to generate reasons to φ would be to come up with norms 
– any norms we like – that tell us to φ. But this is counter-intuitive. Intuitively, normative reasons 
to φ are considerations that justify or count in favour of  φ-ing. But plausibly, the sole fact that 
φ-ing is required by a norm – whatever the norm – does not justify or favour φ-ing to any extent. 
After all, norms can be arbitrary, absurd, immoral, self-destructive, etc. Relative to the norm or 
standard of  successful serial killing, for example, there are reasons (serial killing-reasons) to 
murder as many people as possible without getting caught. But plainly, the mere fact that this 
horrible course of  action is required by some norm does not make it justified to any extent.17 
In any case, I put this issue aside in what follows and argue that assuming that there is a 
                                                
12 Velleman (2000), Wallace (2001), Rosati (2003), O'Hagan (2004), (2005), Ferrero (2009), Korsgaard (1996), 
(2008), (2009), Tubert (2010), (2011), Bertea (2013), and Katsafanas (2013), (Forthcoming). See Enoch (2006) for 
criticism. 
13 E.g. Moore (1903), Scanlon (1998), Shafer-Landau (2003), Wedgwood (2007), Fitzpatrick (2008), Parfit (2011), 
and Enoch (2011). 
14 E.g. Mackie (1977), Garner (1990), Joyce (2001), and Olson (2014). 
15 Korsgaard (1996), (2008), (2009). 
16 See Tiffany (2007) and Finlay (2014) for discussion. 
17 Perhaps the present suggestion is best interpreted not as an identification of normativity with norm-relativity, 
but rather as the claim that there is really no such thing as genuine normativity. If so, then it is compatible with 
the claim of this paper. If there is no genuine normativity, then the aim of belief thesis cannot ground the claim 
that epistemic norms necessarily entail genuinely normative reasons since there are no such reasons. 
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distinction between norm-relativity and genuine normativity, epistemic constitutivism fails as 
an instance of  normative constitutivism.  
 As I mentioned above, EC starts with the claim that belief  constitutively aims at truth. 
That is, part of  what it is for something to be a belief  is for it to be, in some sense, directed or 
regulated towards being true. Since epistemic norms specify truth-related conditions under 
which we are required or permitted to believe propositions, attaining the aim of  belief  plausibly 
involves or requires conforming to epistemic norms.18 Crucially however, belief  seems 
inescapable for beings like us. As Railton explains: 
 
An agent acts on intentions and plans, which constitutively involve beliefs and are formed deliberatively in 
part on the basis of beliefs. To replace all belief with (say) wishing would be to form no intentions at all. 
Moreover, our notion of ourselves as agents extended over time constitutively involves memories and 
expectations. These, too, involve beliefs. […] To delete all forms of belief from your mental repertoire 
would leave you with no recognizable notion of identity. Being “in the belief business” […] is a precondition 
of agency. (Railton 1997, 58-59) 
 
Since beliefs are necessarily involved in essential components of  agency, it follows that we 
necessarily believe things and thus that we cannot avoid the aim of  truth.  
 According to EC, these are all the ingredients we need in order to vindicate Epistemic 
Normativity. Eric Wiland summarizes the strategy as follows: 
 
[T]he nature of  belief  tells us something about reasons for belief. […] The justification for believing the 
truth doesn’t come from something external to the nature of  belief  itself. […] Rather, if  you are even in 
the business of  believing things, you thereby have reason to believe what’s true. Truth is the constitutive 
aim of  belief, and so reasons to believe are necessarily related to considerations concerning what’s believed. 
(Wiland 2012, 117) 
 
Similarly, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen writes: 
 
[A]im theorists hope to explain the norms of  epistemic justification governing belief. Beliefs ought not merely 
to be true—they also ought to be formed in ways that ensure or make it likely that they are true. A natural 
explanation of  such epistemic norms is that following them promotes the aim of  believing truly. […] The 
aim theory promises, in other words, a simple, unified, and prima facie unproblematic explanation of  
epistemic normativity. (Steglich-Petersen 2009, 396) 
 
Since attaining the aim of  truth requires or involves conforming to epistemic norms and since 
we cannot possibly avoid the aim of  truth, epistemic constitutivists conclude that epistemic 
norms necessarily have normative force for us.  
 Is EC plausible? Importantly, there are several possible ways to interpret the claim that 
belief  constitutively aims at truth and different interpretations of  the aim of  belief  thesis yield 
correspondingly different versions of  EC. In the remainder of  this paper, I consider the main 
possible interpretations of  the aim of  belief  thesis and argue that none of  them can plausibly 
ground Epistemic Normativity. 
 
3. The functional interpretation 
On one interpretation, to claim that belief  constitutively aims at truth is to claim that being 
true is the constitutive function or purpose of  belief.19 Alexander Bird, for instance, suggests that 
“[c]ognitive faculties have essential functions, as do bodily organs and the like. The function of  
the liver is to filter toxic impurities out the blood. Likewise, the function of  the faculty of  belief  
                                                
18 I will assume that it does. 
19 See e.g. Velleman (2000), Burge (2003), Bird (2007), and McHugh (2012). 
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is to produce truth/knowledge (depending which you think the aim is).”20 Belief  constitutively 
aims at truth, in other words, in the same sense that the liver constitutively aims at filtering toxic 
impurities out the blood. Just like a liver only functions properly if  it filters the impurities out 
the blood, belief  only functions properly if  it is true.21 This is necessarily the case since having 
this function or purpose is part of  what it is for something to be a belief. 
Can such a functional interpretation of  the aim of  belief  thesis ground Epistemic 
Normativity? According to Epistemic Normativity, there is necessarily a good reason to do as 
epistemic norms say. Therefore, Epistemic Normativity only follows if: 
 
(RFB) There is necessarily a good reason to have properly functioning beliefs.  
 
This raises a question: what grounds this additional normative claim? Is RFB also true in virtue 
of  the fact that belief  has a constitutive function?  
Epistemic constitutivists must answer ‘yes’ because answering ‘no’ would mean 
abandoning their view. Since RFB is a necessary step between the function of  belief  and 
Epistemic Normativity, what grounds it will also ground Epistemic Normativity. So if  RFB is 
not grounded in the aim of  belief, then neither is Epistemic Normativity. Epistemic 
constitutivists cannot ground RFB, for example, in the fact that malfunctioning beliefs are 
always bad for us or that properly functioning beliefs are always intrinsically valuable. If  they 
did, it would be these value claims that would ultimately ground Epistemic Normativity and 
not the fact that truth is the function of  belief. 
 So can the fact that truth is the constitutive function of  belief  itself  ground RFB? The 
analogy with organs raises an initial worry with the idea. Plausibly, our organs have functions 
and we have good reasons to have properly functioning organs. But intuitively, this not in virtue 
of  the very fact that they have these functions. Rather, it seems to be because e.g. having 
properly functioning organs is good for us or because we want to avoid illness, suffering, death, 
etc.  
 One possible answer is that normativity does follow from functions since functions entail 
ought claims and value claims. If  the function of  the liver is to filter impurities out the blood, 
then it seems to follow that qua livers, livers ought to filter impurities out the blood and that livers 
that do not do so are bad qua liver. Likewise, if  beliefs fulfil their function only if  they are true, 
does it not follow that beliefs ought to be true and that false beliefs are necessarily bad qua beliefs?  
 But the sole fact that false beliefs are bad qua beliefs does not entail that there is any good 
reason to avoid them. All it entails is norm-relativity, not genuine normativity. We can very well 
recognize that beliefs ought not to be false relative to the standard set by their function, but still 
ask whether there is any good reason to conform to this function-relative ought. For all the 
functional aim of  belief  says, there could be situations where there is just no good reason to 
have a well-functioning belief. 
 To see this, consider other things which have constitutive functions or purposes. If  
function-relative oughts and values alone entailed genuine normativity, there would necessarily 
                                                
20 Bird (2007, 94). 
21 This is a simplification. As the passage from Bird indicates, proponents of the functional interpretation often 
understand it as the idea that mechanisms, faculties, or systems of belief-formation and revision have the constitutive 
function of producing true beliefs. Another possible formulation is that the constitutive function or purpose of the 
process or activity of belief-formation and revision is to produce true belief. Thus, a belief-forming mechanism or an 
instance belief-formation fulfils its constitutive purpose only if it produces true beliefs. My vague characterization 
of truth being the constitutive function of belief should be read as encompassing those possible more precise 
formulations. The arguments below are meant to apply to the functional version of EC regardless of the more 
precise characterization of the functional aim of belief thesis. 
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be a good reason for anyone engaged in an aim-governed activity to fulfil the purpose of  that 
activity. But this is implausible. Activities like torture or hired killing have constitutive functions 
or purposes, which also entail functional ought-claims and value-claims. Torturers ought qua 
torturers to make their victims suffer as intensely as possible and for as long as possible without 
causing them to pass out. Similarly, hired killers ought qua hired killers to murder their victims 
quickly without leaving a trace. But obviously, that does not mean that there is automatically a 
good reason for torturers and hired killers to do these things. If  it did, then simply taking up 
the role of  torturer or hired killer would suffice to give you a good reason to torture and murder. 
Relatedly, if  being engaged in an aim-governed activity sufficed to generate good reasons to 
attain that activity’s purpose, there would be an implausibly easy way to generate good reasons 
to attain any aim A: we would simply have to create activities – e.g. games – with A as its 
constitutive aim and then engage in these activities. 
 A possible response is that these examples are irrelevant because they are examples of  
activities with bad purposes or functions. Belief  is different, one might say, because true beliefs 
are always instrumentally or finally good.22 This move is not available to epistemic constitutivists 
however since it would mean grounding Epistemic Normativity in the value of  true belief  
rather than in the fact that belief  aims at truth.23 The problem, more generally, is that it does 
not seem possible to explain why there is automatically a good reason to fulfil the function of  
belief, but not that of  torture or hired killing, without invoking factors beyond the sole fact that 
truth is the constitutive function of  belief.  
 Another possible reply is that unlike torture or hired killing, forming and revising beliefs 
is part of  what it is to be an agent. So the claim that EC relies on is not that there is necessarily 
a reason to fulfil the constitutive function of  whatever activity we engage in, but rather: 
 
(RFA) There is necessarily a good reason to fulfil the purpose of  activities that are constitutive of  
agency. 
  
 But why think that being constitutive of  agency makes a normative difference? It cannot 
just be because it makes these activities unavoidable. Unavoidability is not normatively relevant. 
The fact that you cannot help φ-ing does not bear on whether there is any good reason for you 
to φ. The fact that an alcoholic cannot help binge drinking, for example, does not provide any 
justification for her binge drinking. Similarly, suppose it turned out that all human agents are 
necessarily e.g. selfish or cruel under certain circumstances. That by itself  would not make 
selfishness and cruelty in these circumstances justified or right to any extent. At the very least, 
even if  we recognized that such selfishness and cruelty are necessary features of  agency, we 
could still legitimately ask whether there is any good reason to be selfish or cruel under these 
circumstances. 
 Neither can it be because there is necessarily a good reason to be an agent or because 
being an agent is necessarily a good thing. At best, this would entail that there is necessarily a 
reason to have beliefs, but not to always have properly functioning ones. Systematic conformity 
to epistemic norms is not necessary for agency. Agents can very well have beliefs that are 
epistemically irrational, unjustified, incorrect, and so on. Perhaps one cannot count as an agent 
without having at least some properly functioning beliefs. But this would only entail that there is 
a good reason to have some properly functioning beliefs, which clearly falls short of  Epistemic 
Normativity.  
 For all these reasons, I conclude that the claim that truth is the constitutive function of  
belief  cannot plausibly ground Epistemic Normativity. 
                                                
22 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this point.  
23 One alternative suggestion is that to say that belief aims at truth just is to say that true beliefs are necessarily 
good. I take this to fall under the normativist interpretation, which I examine below. 
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4. The personal interpretation 
The problem with the functional version of  EC was that it could not plausibly bridge the gap 
between the constitutive aim of  belief  and what there is good reasons for us to do. Epistemic 
constitutivists cannot plausibly explain why there is necessarily a reason for us to have properly 
functioning beliefs without going beyond the sole fact that truth is the constitutive function of  
belief. One tempting way around this problem is to locate the constitutive aim of  belief  
instead at the personal level and view it as an aim that agents themselves necessarily possess. 
The functional interpretation locates the truth aim at the sub-personal level since it views it as 
an aim that, in a sense, our beliefs or belief-forming mechanisms themselves have. This leaves 
open the question whether at the personal level, agents themselves aim at fulfilling belief ’s 
constitutive aim or function.  
 According to the personal interpretation of  the aim of  belief  thesis however, to say that 
belief  constitutively aims at truth is to say that we necessarily aim at believing the truth 
whenever we form or revise beliefs.24 This is a potential solution to the above problems 
because for many authors, normativity and good reasons are grounded in our aims or desires. 
This view of  normativity goes by many names, but I will refer to it as reasons internalism.25 For 
reasons internalists, whenever a consideration C is a genuinely normative reason for S to φ, 
C has this normative force, roughly, in virtue of  the fact S has an aim that would be served 
by φ-ing. The personal version of  EC is best seen as relying on reasons internalism.26 If  the 
truth aim of  belief  is one that agents necessarily have and if  possessed aims can ground good 
reasons, then Epistemic Normativity might very well follow. 
 Reasons internalism is, of  course, highly controversial. For one thing, it entails that simply 
having an aim – no matter how immoral or self-destructive – can suffice to generate good 
reasons to pursue that aim. But there is certainly something counter-intuitive in the claim that 
one could get good reasons murder, steal, humiliate, torture, and so on, just by aiming at 
accomplishing these acts or by wanting something that requires performing these acts. I will 
leave this worry aside however since even if  we accept reasons internalism, the personal reading 
of  the aim of  belief  thesis is untenable. The claim that we necessarily aim at believing the truth 
whenever we form beliefs is implausible. 
 On one reading, aims are intentions. To aim at φ-ing or to have the aim of  φ-ing is to 
intend to φ. Given the personal interpretation of  the aim of  belief, this would entail that we 
necessarily intend to believe the truth about whether P whenever we form a belief  about 
whether P. But this is implausible. For one thing, this seems to suggest that we necessarily form 
our beliefs intentionally or voluntarily. But even doxastic voluntarists admit that many of  our 
beliefs – e.g. perceptual beliefs – are not formed intentionally. For another, our beliefs are 
sometimes formed unconsciously via processes like wishful thinking, self-deception, or delusion. 
But it is unclear how I can count as intending to believe the truth when I form beliefs in that 
way. Not only do these processes operate sub-personally and without my awareness, they are 
also characterized precisely by a lack of  concern for the truth. 
 On another reading, for someone to aim at something is for her to want or care about that 
thing. Possessed aims, in other words, are desires. On this reading, the personal interpretation 
                                                
24 This distinction between the functional or sub-personal interpretation and the personal interpretation is 
analogous to Vahid’s (2006) distinction between doxastic and epistemic goals, i.e. between beliefs aiming at truth 
and aiming at true beliefs. 
25 Other labels include, for instance, subjectivism, neo-Humeanism, instrumentalism, and desire-based theories. 
For various versions of reasons internalism, see e.g. Williams (1979), Smith (1994), Schroeder (2007), Goldman 
(2009), and Markovits (2014). 
26 The more general view that epistemic normativity is grounded in our aims is commonly labelled epistemic 
instrumentalism in epistemology. See Lockard (2013) for discussion. I also discuss epistemic instrumentalism in Côté-
Bouchard (2015). 
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of  the aim of  belief  is that necessarily, whenever we form or revise a belief  about whether P, 
we want to believe the truth about whether P. However, this is also implausible. It is clearly 
possible for agents to lack the desire to believe the truth about whether P, even in forming a 
belief  about whether P.27 
 First, people sometimes form true beliefs despite wanting to avoid learning the truth about 
the matter at hand. Suppose you recorded last night’s football game and want to avoid knowing 
the score until you watch it tonight, but you inadvertently see the score on a newspaper left 
open in the bus. You immediately and automatically form the true belief  that your favourite 
team lost as a result even though you wanted to avoid knowing the truth about that question at 
that moment. 
 Second, people sometimes form beliefs despite being completely indifferent about the 
matter at hand. Suppose you do not care at all about obscure and random historical facts, but 
cannot help but hear a historian on the radio telling the story of  a 17th century Londoner 
named John. You do not care at all about this trivial and obscure story. It is not remotely 
interesting to you. Nevertheless, as a result of  hearing bits of  the story, you cannot help but 
form the belief  that at least one Londoner named John was born on February 6th 1626. 
Moreover, you form that belief  despite not caring at all about whether someone with that name 
was really born in London on that date.  
 Third, phenomena such as wishful thinking, delusion, and self-deception are also 
problematic for the desire construal. While these processes can (unconsciously) produce genuine 
beliefs, it is hard to see how they could always involve caring for the truth. If  anything, such 
processes seem to be characterized precisely by a lack of  concern for the truth. Suppose you 
are ill and despite your conclusively evidence to the contrary, you become convinced that you 
will certainly recover from your illness. You form that belief  not as the result of  deliberating 
about whether you will recover, but instead unconsciously as the result of  your fear of  dying 
and your inability to cope with the thought of  not recovering. It is hard to see how you can be 
said to have wanted to believe the truth about your health in forming that belief. What you 
wanted was rather that the world be a certain a way and that strong motivation then caused 
you to believe that things really are that way. 
 So it seems clear that we sometimes form the belief  that P without intending or wanting 
to believe the truth about whether P. Is there another possible reading of  the personal 
interpretation? That is, in cases where we form the belief  that P despite neither wanting nor 
intending to believe the truth about whether P, can we still be said to aim at or to have the aim 
of  believing the truth about whether P? 
 Intuitively, it does not seem so. In many of  these cases, the formation of  the belief  is 
something that automatically happens to us whether we like or not. In the football example, my 
inadvertently seeing the score in the paper immediately forces upon me the belief  that my team 
lost. But why think that I am aiming at believing the truth if  it is forced upon me like that? The 
mechanisms that cause me to immediately form that belief  might very well be directed towards 
producing that true belief. But it is hard to see why the aim of  these mechanisms would thereby 
also be my aim. Compare this with our bodily functions. Livers aim at filtering toxic impurities 
out the blood and healthy livers constantly do so without healthy people being aware of  it. But 
it would be strange to say that healthy people – including those who have no idea what livers 
do or those who do not want a properly functioning liver – thereby always aim at filtering toxic 
impurities out of  their blood.  
 Moreover, even if  there were a sense in which we could be said to aim at φ-ing without 
intending or wanting to φ, it is far from clear that such a weak kind of  aim could ground 
genuinely normative reasons. After all, reasons internalists typically ground such reasons 
specifically in desires. For example, Alan H. Goldman introduces reasons internalism as the 
                                                
27 See Kelly (2003) for discussion. 
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claim that “[a] reason is not a reason intrinsically: in itself  it cannot demand on pain of  
irrationality that agents be motivated by it. It is because agents have certain concerns or desires 
that they have reasons” (Goldman 2009, 9). Similarly, according to Mark Schroeder, “[f]or R 
to be a reason for X to do A is for there to be some p such that X has a desire whose object is p, 
and the truth of  R is part of  what explains why X’s doing A promotes p.” (Schroeder 2007, 59) 
The point is that for many reasons internalists, if  you do not care about φ-ing and if  φ-ing 
would not promote anything you care about, then there really is no reason for you to φ. 
 One potential solution to these problems is to construe the personal constitutive aim of  
belief  not as a particular aim that we have every time we form or revise a belief, but rather as 
a global or general aim of  truth. On this alternative reading, even though agents can sometimes 
lack the desire to believe the truth about particular matters, they necessarily have the general 
desire that their beliefs be true. But this is no more plausible. The idea that everyone 
necessarily cares about the truth in that way seems overly optimistic and naïve. Surely, some 
people do not have such a general concern for the truth. At the very least, there is nothing 
incoherent with the idea of  an agent who, for example, only wants her important and nontrivial 
beliefs to be true, or who wants that her beliefs be true, except in cases where believing the 
truth would lead to overwhelmingly bad results. 
 For all these reasons, the personal version of  Epistemic Constitutivism fails as well. Since 
the personal interpretation of  the aim of  belief  thesis is untenable, it cannot plausibly ground 
Epistemic Normativity. 
 
5. The normativist interpretation 
On a final, normativist interpretation, the claim that belief  constitutively aims at that truth is a 
metaphor for the claim that belief  is constitutively governed by a norm of  truth.28 As Ralph 
Wedgwood explains: 
 
It is often claimed that beliefs aim at the truth. Indeed, this claim has often been thought to express an 
essential or constitutive feature of belief. But this claim is obviously not literally true. Beliefs are not little 
archers armed with little bows and arrows: they do not literally “aim” at anything. The claim must be 
interpreted as a metaphor. I propose to interpret this claim as a normative claim – roughly, as the claim 
that a belief is correct if and only if the proposition believed is true. (Wedgwood 2002, 267) 
 
As the last passage indicates, a popular candidate for the constitutive truth norm of  belief  is the 
following: 
  
 (TN)  A belief  is correct if  and only if  it is true. 
 
Using TN as our example, we can therefore characterize the normativist version of  the aim of  
belief  thesis as the claim that belief  is constitutively governed by the epistemic norm TN. That 
is, part of  what it is for something to be a belief  is for it to be correct if  and only if  it is true. Can 
this version of  the aim of  belief  thesis ground Epistemic Normativity? 
 Recall that according to Epistemic Normativity, there is necessarily a good reason to do as 
epistemic norms say. Therefore, Epistemic Normativity only follows from the normativist aim 
of  belief  thesis if: 
 
 (RTN)  There is necessarily a good reason to believe correctly.  
 
                                                
28 For the claim that belief has a constitutive norm, see Brandom (1994), Adler (2002), Wedgwood (2002), 
Boghossian (2003), Shah (2003), Engel (2004), Millar (2004), Gibbard (2005), Shah and Velleman (2005), Zangwill 
(2005), Whiting (2010), Littlejohn (2012), (2013), and Nolfi (2015). See also McHugh and Whiting (2014) and 
Fassio (2015) for overviews of issues surrounding normativism. 
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Once again, constitutivists must say that this further normative claim is also true in virtue of  the 
fact that belief  aims at truth. To ground RTN in something else – e.g. the final or instrumental 
value of  correct beliefs – would be to ground Epistemic Normativity in these facts about value 
and not in the fact that belief  aims at truth. But can the normativist aim of  belief  thesis ground 
RTN? 
 It is far from clear. Recall the distinction between norm-relativity and normativity. While 
any norm trivially sets a standard relative to which certain things are correct or incorrect, this 
leaves open the normative question whether there is any good reason to conform to that norm. 
So to posit a constitutive norm of  belief  is not yet to say that there is a good reason to do as 
that norm says. As an analogy, writing the same number twice in one of  the columns of  a 
Sudoku grid is incorrect relative to the constitutive norms or rules of  Sudoku. Yet there might 
be no good reason for me to avoid that incorrect Sudoku move. Similarly, we can very well 
accept that according to TN, a belief  is correct if  and only if  it is true, but still ask whether 
there is any good reason to have correct beliefs. Maybe there is necessarily such a reason. But 
the point is that the sole fact that it is correct in a certain respect does not entail that there is.  
 It won’t help to point out that belief, unlike other norm-governed activities like games, is 
something agents necessarily engage in. First, as I pointed out above, unavoidability is not 
normatively relevant. We can very well ask the normative question about norm-governed 
activities that are unavoidable for agents. Consider the activity of  using a language. Languages 
have constitutive norms or rules. Moreover, using a language is arguably unavoidable and 
perhaps even constitutive of  what it is to be a human agent. Yet rules of  languages are often 
considered to lack necessary normative force.29 Second, although belief  or the faculty of  belief  
might be constitutive of  agency, always believing correctly is not. So even if  being constitutive 
of  agency is normatively relevant, good reasons to always believe correctly do not follow. At 
best, it vindicates reasons to merely have beliefs or to have some correct beliefs. 
 Another possible move for the normativist epistemic constitutivist is to build genuine 
normativity directly in the constitutive norm of  belief. On this interpretation, ‘correct’ and 
‘incorrect’ in TN are genuinely normative notions, i.e. notions that already entail good reasons. 
It is constitutive of  belief, in other words, that we should – in the genuinely normative sense of  
‘should’ – believe something if  and only if  it is true.  
 Aside from its seemingly question-begging character, the main problem with this move is 
that it also means abandoning epistemic constitutivism. EC is a strategy for grounding or 
explaining Epistemic Normativity. For EC, it is because belief  constitutively aims at truth that 
epistemic norms necessarily have normative force. But on the suggestion I am now considering, 
the aim of  belief  thesis does not ground or explain Epistemic Normativity. It just is Epistemic 
Normativity. If  TN is genuinely normative, then what grounds TN? The answer cannot be the 
aim of  belief  thesis since TN just is the aim of  belief  thesis according to normativism. Hence, 
if  it is to be grounded at all, it must be grounded in something beyond the aim of  belief, which 
makes EC false.  
 But perhaps TN does not need grounding. Perhaps it is a sui generis or brute fact that we 
should – in the genuinely normative sense – believe something if  and only if  it is true. This 
alternative option is no more helpful for EC however. First, epistemic constitutivism is the claim 
that the aim of  belief  thesis grounds or explains Epistemic Normativity. But if  TN (and thus 
Epistemic Normativity) is a sui generis fact, then the aim of  belief  does not ground it since 
nothing grounds it. So adopting this version of  normativism means abandoning the project or 
concern that gave rise to the constitutivist strategy in the first place, namely that of  explaining 
in virtue of  what epistemic norms have necessary normative force. 
 Second, making this claim also means abandoning the central motivation for EC. As I 
explained above, normative error theorists think that genuine inescapable normativity does not 
                                                
29 See Hattiangadi (2007) for discussion. 
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exist because it requires the existence of  mysterious nonnatural facts. The main advantage of  
constitutivism was that it promised to vindicate inescapable normativity without positing such 
facts. However, this is not what the present version of  normativism attempts to do. All it says is 
that beliefs just are genuinely normative entities and that this is a sui generis or brute fact. But 
this does not address the worry that such entities and facts are mysterious. For the error theorist, 
this version of  normativism would simply mean that beliefs are also mysterious nonnatural 
entities and thus that there are no such things. If  normativism claims that Epistemic 
Normativity is a sui generis or brute fact, then it is best seen not as an alternative to 
nonnaturalism, but as an instance of  it. 
 I therefore conclude that the normativist version of  epistemic constitutivism is not 
promising either. The claim that truth is the constitutive norm of  belief  cannot plausibly ground 
Epistemic Normativity. 
 
6. Conclusion 
According to Epistemic Normativity, epistemic norms necessarily entail genuinely normative 
reasons. According to epistemic constitutivism (EC), Epistemic Normativity is true ultimately 
in virtue of  the fact that belief  constitutively aims at truth. I examined various versions of  EC 
based on the main possible interpretations of  the aim of  belief  thesis. I argued that none of  
these versions of  the thesis can plausibly ground Epistemic normativity.30 I therefore conclude 
that epistemic constitutivism is hopeless as a strategy for grounding Epistemic Normativity. 
 Of  course, this does not mean that Epistemic Normativity is false. Perhaps conforming 
to epistemic norms necessarily leads to intrinsically good things. Or perhaps Epistemic 
Normativity is a sui generis or brute fact. However, if  you are moved by the central motivation 
for EC and if  EC is indeed hopeless, then Epistemic Normativity becomes more problematic. 
Recall that EC promised to accomplish what neither the nonnaturalist nor the error theorist 
think can be done, namely vindicating necessary normativity without positing nonnatural facts. 
But if  EC is false and if  nonnatural facts are off  the table for you, then you might have to 
conclude that Epistemic Normativity must be abandoned.  
 Would you then have to go for an epistemic error theory and conclude that there are no 
truths and facts about what we epistemically should believe? Only if  you think that our concept 
of  an epistemic norm is that of  a norm with necessary normative force. But this is not the only 
option. Perhaps Epistemic Normativity is false not (or not only) because necessary normativity 
does not exist, but rather because our concept of  an epistemic norm is not, after all, that of  a 
norm that necessarily entails good reasons. That is, perhaps epistemic norms have the same 
kind of  normative authority as e.g. norms of  etiquette, fashion, games, and the like. If  this is 
right, then there can still be facts about what we epistemically should believe. But just like facts 
about what we should do according to etiquette, they are not genuinely normative facts.  
                                                
30 Another potential worry with EC is that it may prove too much. It is widely that young infants and non-human 
animals can have beliefs. But if beliefs constitutively aim at truth and if, as EC claims, this fact suffices to grounds 
Epistemic Normativity, it seems to follow that there is necessarily a good reason even for infants and animals to 
conform to epistemic norms. However, many think that such beings cannot be subject to genuine normativity and 
reasons. It is not clear, after all, that infants and animals can φ for reasons. Relatedly, it seems strange to say, for 
example, that dogs should not believe against their evidence or that infants should suspend judgment about 
whether P if they have no evidence for or against P. 
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